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The Contours of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction in Drug Smuggling
Cases
Stephen E. Chelberg*

Each day vast quantities of drugs are smuggled into the United States. 1
Often a large ocean going ship, the "mother ship," waits offshore beyond
the territorial seas of the United States. When the ship is not being observed, smugglers unload drugs onto high speed boats which then take the
drugs to shore. In order to control the flow of drugs introduced into the
country by this method, the Coast Guard must take action against the
smugglers on the mother ship even though the ship is in international
waters. 2
The Coast Guard has the power to arrest violators of U.S. laws on "any
vessel subject to the jurisdiction or to the operation of any law, of the
United States." 3 With respect to drug smuggling on the high seas, 4 the
Coast Guard derives extraterritorial jurisdiction from the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 5 and the 1980 Marijuana
on the High Seas Act. 6 Because Congress intended that these statutes be
applied in a manner consistent with international law, 7 their extraterritorial reach depends upon U.S. judicial interpretations of the principles
of jurisdiction recognized by international law.
This note examines the contours of U.S. jurisdiction over drug smugglers on the high seas. 8 After a brief discussion of the two principal U.S.
drug statutes, the note considers the territorial and protective principles of
jurisdiction as defined by U.S. courts. Controversy currently centers
around whether U.S. drug laws apply to foreign ships, carrying controlled
substances on the high seas, where there has been no showing of an intent
to import the drugs into the United States.
* Stephen E. Chelberg is a member of the class of 1983, University of Michigan Law

School.
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CONGRESSIONAL INTENT UNDERLYING THE
CURRENT DRUG LAWS
Congress designed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 to consolidate and simplify prior laws concerning the
illegal use of drugs. 9 The Act provides in part that it is illegal to import,
export, manufacture or distribute drugs knowing or intending that they
will be unlawfully imported into the United States, and that it is illegal to
possess such drugs on any vehicles, vessel, or aircraft in the United States
or within the U.S. customs area. 10
In passing the 1970 Drug Act, Congress repealed the Narcotic Drugs
Import Export Act. 11 That Act provided in part that unexplained extraterritorial possession of drugs was sufficient for conviction where there was
intent to illegally import drugs into the United States. Inadvertently Congress did not create a new statute to replace this provision. 12 The result
was that a smuggler on a ship beyond the U.S. customs area could not be
prosecuted for possession. He could only be prosecuted for attempted
unlawful importation or conspiracy to do the same. Given the greater
burden of showing an attempt or conspiracy to import drugs, prosecutors
found it difficult to obtain evidence which established the guilt of the

offenders.

13

The 1980 Marijuana on the High Seas Act supplements the 1970 Act.
The new Act provides in part that, "it is illegal for any person to possess,
manufacture or distribute a controlled substance either knowing or intending that it be illegally imported into the United States." 14 Thus a simple
showing of possession with knowledge that the drugs will be imported is
now sufficient to convict a defendant. This relieves the prosecution of the
burden-imposed by the 1970 Act-of showing an attempt or conspiracy.
Both the 1970 and 1980 Acts apply extraterritorially. At the outset,
there was some uncertainty whether the 1970 Act so applied. Under established principles of statutory construction, however, the courts have determined that the Act extends to offenses committed outside the United
States, because the Act's scope and usefulness would be seriously curtailed
if it did not. 15 To avoid any ambiguity, Congress expressly stated that the
1980 Act reaches, "acts of possession, manufacture or distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 16
While the two drug statutes now clearly extend to extraterritorial
offenders, the scope of their application depends upon the principles of
jurisdiction recognized by international law. This is so first becauseabsent an express legislative intent to the contrary-courts will construe
statutes in a manner consistent with international law. 17 Congress did not
express any views on jurisdiction in the 1970 Act and thus is presumed to
have intended compliance with the principles of jurisdiction. With respect
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to the 1980 Act, Congress explicitly indicated that the statute affords the
Justice Department, "the maximum prosecutorial authority permitted
under international law." 18
Whatever the legislative intention, the principles of jurisdiction may
impose a second, more fundamental constraint on the extraterritorial reach
of the drug statutes: "[a] necessary condition to the competence of a state
to enforce its laws is that it have the capacity to prescribe them." 19 As will
be discussed in detail below, the courts have consistently defined prescriptive capacity in terms of the principles of jurisdiction recognized by international law. 20 The courts' views of these principles have evolved as the
problem of drug smuggling has grown.

PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION
Several principles are relevant to the assertion of jurisdiction over drug
smugglers at sea. 21 First, the territorial principle recognizes that a sovereign state has jurisdiction over all acts committed within its territory. 22
Given the problem of crimes occurring in more than one state, the strict
territorial definition was expanded to include the objective and subjective
territorial principles. 23 The subjective principle applies where criminal
acts are initiated in the state asserting jurisdiction but come to fruition
elsewhere. 24 The objective territorial principle applies where the act is
initiated outside the state asserting jurisdiction but produces effects within
it. 25 U.S. courts have frequently employed both the subjective and the
objective principles. 26
Another theory on which courts have relied to find jurisdiction in drug
smuggling cases is the protective principle. The Harvard Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime defined this principle in the following manner:
A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its
territory by an alien against the security, territorial integrity or political
independence of that State, provided that the act or omission which constitutes the crime was not committed in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the
alien by the law of the place where it was committed. 27
Although the acts proscribed according to this principle vary from country
to country, they generally include acts against a nation's security such as
treason and acts against state officials. 28 U.S. courts have recognized this
principle in cases of fraud in an application for a U.S. visa, and counterfeit-

ing. 29
Finally, the nationality principle rests on the inherent power of a sover-

46

TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

eign state to regulate the acts of its citizens. It provides that a nation has
jurisdiction over the acts of its citizens wherever they may be. Although
a state cannot enforce its criminal law within the territory of another state,
a state may compel observance of its law by punishment if a person who
has broken the law outside the state's territory returns to it. 30 In several
cases, U.S. courts have used the nationality principle to uphold jurisdiction
over the extraterritorial acts of U.S. citizens. 31
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONAL
PRINCIPLES: INTERPRETATION IN U.S. COURTS.
The Territorial Principle
The traditional definition of the objective territorial principle requires an
actual effect on the United States before jurisdiction can attach to criminal
acts. 32 In order to capture drug smugglers, it is often necessary for the
Coast Guard to intercept a mother ship stationed beyond the territorial
seas of the United States, before an actual effect on the United States
occurrs. Under the traditional definition no jurisdiction would obtain over
the acts of foreign smugglers on board the mother ship. In order for
jurisdiction to attach the Coast Guard would need proof of an attempt to
illegally import drugs that had actual effects on the United States, or would
have to wait until the smugglers entered U.S. waters.
U.S. courts have responded to this problem by broadening the definition
of the objective territorial principle to require only an intent to produce
effects in the territory of the United States. 33 The courts also have refined
the subjective and objective territorial principles to apply to the inchoate
crime of conspiracy to import drugs: where one overt act of the conspiracy
has occurred within the United States, jurisdiction will be exercised over
all the conspirators. 34 Pressured by the need for effective law enforcement
against drug smugglers, the courts have pushed the principles of jurisdiction to their limits.
The Actual Effects Requirement
Mr. Justice Holmes' traditional formulation of the objective territorial
principle in Strassheim v. Dailey 35 is the one most commonly cited. In Strassheim, Dailey was convicted to inducing a Michigan public official to pay
bills presented to the state which the official knew to be fraudulent. Dailey
was never in Michigan and defended his extradition from Illinois on the
grounds that the facts alleged did not constitute a crime against the laws
of Michigan. In sustaining Michigan's assertion of jurisdiction over the
defendant's acts, Justice Holmes stated,
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Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the
harm as if he (the actor) has been present at the effect, if the State should
succeed in getting him within its power. 36
Even though Strassheim involved application of a particular state's law
beyond its territory, the Strassheim formulation of the objective territorial
principle has been used to extend U.S. law to the high seas and to foreign
countries.
A 1967 drug smuggling case, Rivard v. United States, 37 entailed a variation
on the Strassheim formulation. In Rivard, Canadian nationals were prosecuted under U.S. law for conspiracy to smuggle heroin into the United
States, and one defendant was charged with the substantive offense of
smuggling heroin. The defendants had arranged for drugs to be bought
abroad and then by various means to be transported to and sold in the
United States. Eventually one of the defendants was arrested in Laredo,
Texas when he brought seventy-six pounds of heroin into the United
States. On the basis of this defendant's testimony, the other conspirators
were extradited from Canada and were convicted in Texas.
The major defense raised on appeal was that the district court did not
have jurisdiction to try the alien defendants since they never entered the
United States. The court of appeals rejected this defense and held that
jurisdiction over the offense existed. The court employed a test propounded by Mr. Justice Taft in Ford v. United States, 38 an early liquor smuggling
case:
The overt acts charged in the conspiracy to justify indictment... were acts
within the jurisdiction of the United States, and the conspiracy charged,
although some of the conspirators were corporally [beyond U.S. territory],
had for its object crime in the United States and was carried on partly in and
partly out of this country.... 39
Using this standard, the court held the defendants' acts were within U.S.
jurisdiction.
The traditional definition of the objective territorial approach was sufficient to sustain jurisdiction in Rivard since the conspiracy had come to
fruition and had produced effects within the United States. However, in
cases of attempt or conspiracy which lack an effect within the United
States, the traditional definition would not suffice. Courts have therefore
de-emphasized the need for an actual effect, present in both Ford and Rivard.
Instead they have employed the two other elements suggested by the Ford
test: an intent to violate U.S. laws and an overt act committed within the
United States.
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The Overt Acts Formulation as Applied
to Drug Smuggling Cases
One of the first drug smuggling cases where the overt acts formulation was
used was United States v. Postal 40 In Postal the Coast Guard stopped the
smugglers' ship-carrying a flag of the Grand Cayman Islands-at points
eight to sixteen miles off the Florida coast. After boarding the ship, the
Coast Guard discovered that it carried several tons of marijuana, and
arrested the crewmen and took them to Miami.
One of the jurisdictional defenses raised on appeal of the crew's conviction, was that the "United States lacked competence to prescribe rules
making [the defendant's] conduct on the high seas criminal." 41 The Fifth
Circuit responded to this defense by first noting that the "United States
has long adhered to the objective principle of territorial jurisdiction." 42
According to the court, the objective territorial principle "holds that [the
United States] has jurisdiction to attach criminal consequences to extraterritorial acts that are intended to have an effect in the United States, at least
where overt acts within the United States can be proved." 43 The court
found that the requisite intent had been shown and that the outfitting and
sale of the LaRosa, which occurred in Florida, satisfied the overt act requirement. Thus the court concluded that the U.S. had jurisdiction over the
defendants.
Postal represented a significant modification of the objective territorial
principle since jurisdiction was upheld over a conspiracy even though its
effects had not occurred in the United States. Unlike Rivard and Ford, Postal
involved a conspiracy whose effects had been cut short. Although it did
not explicitly recognize the point, the court thus extended the objective
territorial principle to a new situation: where an effect on the United States
was intended but did not come to pass, and where at least one overt act
occurred in the U.S. Given the apparent origination within the United
States of an objectionable activity-a conspiracy to import drugs, jurisdiction in Postal might also have been maintained under the subjective territorial principle, but the court did not recognize this point.
A FurtherModification of the Objective TerritorialPrinciple:
Intent to Produce Effects in the United States
While Postal and several other cases pointed to intent and an overt act in
furtherance of a conspiracy as the elements required by the objective
territorial principle, more recent decisions have eliminated any requirement of an overt act. These cases hold that mere intent to violate U.S. drug
laws suffices for jurisdictional purposes. 44 This further relaxation of limitations on the objective territorial principle appears to have stemmed from
language in United States v. Postal.

JURISDICTION

49

In a footnote, the Postal court suggested that proof of an overt act may

no longer be required for jurisdictional purposes. 45 In support of its
suggestion the Postal court cited three cases: United States v. Johnson; 46 United
States v. Littrel; 47 and United States v. Thomas. 48 The facts of these cases,
however, show that the conspiracies in question occurred entirely in the
United States. The holdings that no overt act need be proven were related
to the proof needed to sustain a conspiracy conviction under the 1970 Act,
not whether mere intent would suffice to uphold a court's jurisdiction over
acts committed on the high seas; in evolving jurisdictional standards that
comport with international law, the court relied on statutory standards for
upholding conspiracy charges that bear no relation to the concerns embodied in international principles of jurisdiction. The Postal court erred in
relying on these cases to suggest that mere intent might sustain jurisdiction. Although the suggestion is dictum, Postal's discussion of jurisdiction
created a new line of reasoning.
In a series of recent cases, courts in the First 49 and Fifth 50 Circuits have
concluded that mere intent to violate U.S. drug laws is sufficient to sustain
jurisdiction over an extraterritorial conspiracy to import drugs and, in two
cases, over extraterritorial possession with intent to distribute. In all of
these cases the defendants were importing large quantities of drugs but
had not committed any overt act within the United States. The Coast
Guard apprehended these smugglers in various areas of the seas, anywhere
from six to 150 miles from the U.S. coast.
The arguments against jurisdiction in these cases focused on the lack of
any overt act occurring in the United States. For instance, in United States
v. Williams, 51 the defendant admitted the conspiracy was designed to have
effects within the territory of the United States. The defendant, however,
pointed to United States v. Winter 52 where the court stated that jurisdiction
obtained over a group of conspirators, "if there [were] sufficient proof that
at least one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court." 53
Relying in part on the Postal dictum, the Williams court rejected this
argument. Their first response was that the Winter court itself stated that
the relevant statutory prohibition does not explicitly require proof of an
overt act. The court then concluded that, because the statute does not
explicitly require an overt act, an overt act is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction. 54 This conclusion is erroneous, however, because the court confused
the issue of jurisdiction with the issue of proof needed to sustain a conviction for conspiracy.
Similarly, other courts have reasoned that in order for the drug statutes
to be most effective, they must apply to cases where only intent can be
shown. 55 Again, however, the courts have relied on the statutes to determine the scope of jurisdiction. This is incorrect because-for the reasons
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noted above 56 -the extraterritorial application of the statutes is constrained by principles of jurisdiction recognized under international law. 57
If the courts intend to refine the principles of jurisdiction, they should
address directly the issue of the proper reach of a nation's extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
The courts' faulty reasoning is especially disturbing because the results
to which it leads are unprecedented. In smuggling cases, the Supreme
Court and all lower courts prior to 1979 had only refined the territorial
principle to allow for extraterritorial jurisdiction where some overt act had
occurred within the United States. 58 Yet, relying on the dictum of Postal,
recent cases have established a new jurisdictional standard in the drug
smuggling cases: intent to violate U.S. drug laws suffices to establish jurisdiction under the objective territorial principle.
Although this new standard may not ultimately prove to be objectionable, its recent development is questionable. In most cases employing the
mere intent doctrine alternative, more established grounds of jurisdiction
were available. In four of the cases all the defendants were American, so
the courts could have asserted jurisdiction over them purely on the basis
of the nationality principle. 59 Additionally two cases involved U.S. vessels, justifying special U.S. maritime jurisdiction. 60
United States v. Ricardo 61 did involve foreign defendants captured on
board a foreign vessel. Even in Ricardo, however, the court could arguably
have sustained jurisdiction under the overt acts doctrine. At the outset,
some of the conspirators apparently left Florida in a smaller vessel in order
to meet the mother ship. 62 In addition, the vessel which was to have
received the drugs from the mother ship may have originated in the United
States, again satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of the overt acts
doctrine. 63
While the courts may have reached the correct results in Ricardo and the
other cases, they employed innovative reasoning when it was not necessary. United States v. Egan 64 is the only case in which the mere intent
formulation may actually have been necessary to sustain jurisdiction. In
Egan, foreign defendants were captured on board a stateless vessel forty
miles off the U.S. coast. There were no apparent overt acts within the
United States. Yet, the district court found jurisdiction, relying primarily
on the questionable cases discussed above.
The Current Status of the Objective Territorial Principle

Under the formulation of the objective territorial principle currently employed by the courts, mere intent to violate U.S. drug laws suffices to
uphold jurisdiction. This supercedes or at least supplements the overt acts
plus intent formulation which preceeded it. This new development may
ultimately be necessary for effective drug enforcement. However, in the
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cases developing this refinement of the territorial principle, alternative

bases of jurisdiction were available and should have been employed instead. Perhaps even more disturbing is the lack of convincing reasoning to
support the mere intent formulation. The courts have yet to discuss a
justification for this formulation or its precedential basis. Moreover, the
cases do not indicate when and how the courts may infer intent to violate
U.S. drug laws.
Protective Principle
An alternative principle of jurisdiction is the protective principle. In the
case of drug smugglers, the government has used the protective principle
to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction in only a few cases. In these cases, the
protective principle has been used generally as an alternative justification
for asserting jurisdiction. 65 The reluctance to use the principle may stem
from questions concerning its legitimate application in drug smuggling
cases. The courts have traditionally applied the protective principle only
to acts threatening the national security, or governmental interest. 66 As
discussed below, 67 it is difficult to see how drug smuggling threatens these
interests.
In spite of the uncertain theoretical basis for employing the protective
principle in drug smuggling cases, UnitedStates v. Angola 68 relied exclusively

upon the principle to support jurisdiction. There, the defendant foreign
nationals had been picked up amid the islands of the Bahamas, 300 to 350
miles from the United States. 69 They were charged with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute. In sustaining jurisdiction
over the defendants' act, the court concluded that the protective principle
"supports assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction without a showing of
actual effects on the nation. It is enough to show that the activity which
the nation seeks to regulate has a potentially adverse effect on the nation." 70
The court reasoned that "it is necessary to attempt regulation of vessels
on the high seas notwithstanding the observance of any objective proof of
an intent to import into the United States." 7 Although the court restricted
its holding to the case of stateless vessels, the court suggested in dicta that
the protective principle might offer a basis of jurisdiction in other cases. 72
There is virtually no support in the case law for the position taken by the
court. The Angola opinion itself is virtually a verbatim quote from an
unreported opinion, United States v. Pauth-Arzuza. 73 In neither Angola nor

Pauth-Arzuza does the court examine the rationale behind the protective
principle or consider why it should apply in drug smuggling cases.
Fortunately, not all of the courts have been so cavalier in extending
jurisdiction under the protective principle. In United States v. James-Robin-
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son, 74 Columbian citizens were arrested on a stateless vessel more than 400
miles from the continental United States. The defendants were charged
with possessing a controlled substance with an intent to distribute it, in
violation of the 1980 Marijuana on the High Seas Act. The prosecution
stipulated that it would not attempt to prove at trial that the defendants
had the intent to unload or distribute controlled substances in the United
States.
In sustaining the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
the court first reviewed the congressional intent underlying the 1980
Act. 75 The court concluded that Congress intended to abide by international law, and therefore had to consider whether the indictment was
proper under the international law of jurisdiction. The court then examined the international bases of jurisdiction and asserted that the indictment
had to "stand or fall on the protective principle of the international law
of jurisdiction." 76 The objective territorial principle would not suffice
because "the United States [had] specifically declined to assert that the acts
of the defendants on the high seas were intended to cause an effect
here." 77 The court stated that "the protective principle is limited to situations where there is at least a potentially adverse effect on the sovereign's
security or its governmental functions." 78
With respect to how this principle has been applied in the United States
the court indicated (without noting Angola):
All cases which have invoked the protective principle were actions where
there was a demonstrable effect on the United States in particular. Never in
a published opinion of an American court has a potentially generalized effect,
which might or might not also be an effect on the United States, been
sufficient to invoke the protective principle of international law. 79
Given this case law and the fact that the government would not show a
nexus between the smugglers and the United States, the court rejected the
government's claim of jurisdiction over the acts of the defendants and
dismissed the indictment. 80
The rationale of James-Robinson and Angola are clearly irreconcilable. So
too are their results: both boats were seized 300 to 400 miles from the U.S.
coast. Angola in fact presented highly questionable circumstances for
upholding jurisdiction. The defendants there were sailing much closer to
the Bahamas than they were to the United States.
In light of the prosecution's failure to offer proof as to the intention of
the defendants in Angola, it is quite possible that they had no intention to
come to the United States and that they planned to sell their cargo elsewhere. If this was the case, the United States had no justification under

JURISDICTION

53

international law for exercising jurisdiction. Indeed, the Justice Department itself stated:
To have jurisdiction over ... distribution of a controlled substance by a
non-U.S. citizen on foreign vessels on the high seas, the United States must
show an actual or potential adverse effect within its territory. It is doubtful
that such an adverse effect could be demonstrated in the absence of intent
to import the substance into the United States or knowledge that it will be
imported. 81
Even where there is an intent to violate U.S. drug laws it is doubtful that
the protective principle should be a basis for jurisdiction. Courts have
applied the principle only to acts threatening national security or a governmental function. The protective principle has historically been limited to
acts of treason or counterfeiting the seal or currency of the United States. 83
Drug trafficking may have an adverse effect on the health of the American
people, but its effect is not the same as treason, which results in an immediate threat to the security of our country. If the protective principle is
applied in drug smuggling cases, it could be applied in almost any situation. Without principled limits to jurisdiction there is the possibility of
international confrontation.
The use of the protective principle in drug smuggling cases is not only
theoretically questionable, it is unnecessary-especially if the objective
territorial principle merely requires an intent to violate U.S. laws. Even if
the courts adopt a more conservative view of the objective principle, as
demonstrated above, they can sustain jurisdiction in most cases. In any
event, there should be a minimum limit to the reach of U.S. jurisdiction
in the drug smuggling cases: where the United States cannot at least prove
an intent to affect U.S. interests, the courts ought to deny jurisdiction.
Absent such an intent, it is difficult to justify U.S. jurisdiction over the acts
of the accused.

CONCLUSION
The courts have extended both the objective territorial and the protective
principles of jurisdiction in drug smuggling cases. This article has examined the demise, since Postal, of any overt acts requirement for the exercise
of jurisdiction under an objective territorial principle, and has questioned
the legitimacy of the judicial reasoning behind this demise; in moving
toward the position that mere intent to produce effects in the U.S. will
support jurisdiction, the courts mistakenly relied on a statutory standard
relating to conspiracies occurring in the U.S. In justifying this extension of
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jurisdiction, the courts have failed to address the more fundamental considerations behind the principles of jurisdiction.
This article has also expressed skepticism toward any use of the protective principle as a basis for asserting jurisdiction in typical drug smuggling
cases, for such cases lack a clear nexus between the offense and national
security. Without a clear nexus, this principle could too easily be abused.
In light of the courts' expansion of the territorial principle, such questionable use of the protective principle appears unnecessary as well as unwise.
NOTES
1 In 1970, for example, an average of over 2000 kilograms of marijuana was imported into
the United States each day. MARIJUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, TH TCImuCAL PAPERS
OF nm NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE 600 (1972).
2 Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of
the Comm. on Merchant Marine andFisherieson H.R. 2538, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) (statement
of Mario Biaggi, chairman of the subcommittee).
314 U.S.C. § 89 (1976). Section 89 authorizes the Coast Guard to inquire, examine, inspect,
search, seize, and arrest on the high seas to prevent, detect, and suppress violations of U.S.
law:

for such purposes ... officers may at any time go on board any vessel subject to the
jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquires to those on
board, examine the ships' documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the
vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. (emphasis added.)
4 There are at least three major divisions of jurisdiction over waters adjacent to the United
States: (a) the territorial seas extending three miles, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1976); (b) the
contiguous zone extending twelve miles for customs enforcement, 19 U.S.C. § 14010) (1976);
(c) the economic zone for regulating fishing within 200 miles of the United States, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1811 (1976). U.S. courts have recognized that the high seas, as defined by the United States,
applies to that area of the ocean beyond three miles. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11,
22 (1969); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064, n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980). In another case the government conceded that the area from three
to twelve miles is part of the high seas for criminal jurisdiction purposes. United States v.
Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980).
One other basis for a statutory definition of the extent of U.S. jurisdiction over adjacent
waterways is the 1935 Anti-smuggling Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-11 (1976). It provides that the
United States has jurisdiction over seas up to sixty-two miles away from the U.S. coast and
100 miles laterally from any ship stopped within that zone, when there is a reasonable
suspicion that the ship is engaged in smuggling. At least one scholar has suggested that this
would offer a basis for jurisdiction over hovering "mother ships." Ficken, The 1935 AntiSmuggling Act Applied to Hovering Narcotics Smugglers Beyond the Contiguous Zone: An Assessment under
International Law, 29 U. MIAMI L. Rzv. 700 (1975).
5 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
6 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(a)-(h) (West 1981).
7 See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
8 This note does not discuss issues pertaining to the fourth amendment or the Convention
on the High Seas. 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1958).

JURISDICTION

55

For an excellent discussion of fourth amendment issues raised by the apprehension of
drug smugglers on the high seas, see Carmichael, At Sea with the FourthAmendment, 32 U. MrAWM
L. Rsv. 51 (1977). See generally Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, The Fourth Amendment, and
WarrantlessSearches at Sea, 93 HAlv. L. REv. 725 (1980). For a discussion of how U.S. courts have
applied the Convention on the High Seas to drug smugglers seized in international waters,
see Note, "'DoubleJeopardy" on the High Seas: InternationalNarcotics Traffickers Beware, 10 GA. J. I'L
& Comp. L. 647 (1980).
9 H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4566, 4567.
10 21 U.S.C. §§ 952-55 (1976).
11 Pub. L. No..
- Stat. (.
).
12 S. REP. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2785.
13 Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 32 (statement of Benjamin A. Gilman,
member of Congress).
14 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(d) (West 1981).
15 Courts may declare that Congress intended a law to apply extraterritorially, given the
nature of the offense, under the "Bowman doctrine." In United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S.
94 (1922), the Supreme Court sustained jurisdiction over a conspiracy to defraud a U.S.
agency even though the conspiracy took place abroad. After referring to the principle that
crimes "which affect the peace and good order of the community, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government" in the absence of express evidence
of a contrary intent on the part of Congress, Chief Justice Taft continued:
But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which
are, as a class, not logically dependant on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against
obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated ....
Some such offenses can only be
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Government because of the local
acts required to constitute them. Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly
territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the
statute. ... In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific
provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but
allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.
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